Ted's Nugget

Are we sad in virtue of some other thing being sad for us? I think if we accept Quine's view, then yes we are sad in virtue of some other thing. Because Quine would say we are not sad, but a part of us is sad. But I don't think we are sad in virtue of some other thing. And I like Quine's view. Is there any way around this?

Is Physical Possibility Relevant?

I'm often annoyed by these wild scenarios we talk about in class. At first, I will be interested. With more thought, I will become confused. And with more thought, I will just decide that the answer doesn't matter because the scenario we're discussing is not physically/biologically possible.
Does it matter if we're not talking about realistically (physically) possible scenarios?

Essential Property

Is having a body an essential property of personal identity? I just thought this was an interesting idea to consider. Here's a scenario where it applies. Consider a process by which a scan of the brain can be completed so your personality and all of your mental qualities can be stored in a computer. This computer would claim to be you and so clearly would you. So who would be "the real" you. Also what if the scan destroyed your body and all that was left was the machine claiming to be you? Would that change anything?